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A Model For Analyzing the Constitutionality of
Sobriety Roadblock Stops In Utah
judge Lynn W. Davis*
Kenneth R. Wallentine**
Throughout the nation police departments have resorted to roadblocks for enforcement of drunk driving laws. Utah is no exception, and
should not be. However, courts and legislatures need direction on how
to approach the constitutionality of such roadblocks. This article
presents a model for analyzing the constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoints.
Officers of one major Utah city police department established
roadblocks at random, without supervisory or prosecutorial review. At
these roadblocks, drivers were stopped on a busy city center street
under the guise of a driver's license checkpoint. There were no warning
signs and no advance public notice. Not coincidentally, the roadblock
was positioned in front of the city's most popular bar. The individual
officers determined how long, if at all, each driver would be detained. A
police car flashing a red spotlight blocked the right traffic lane, while
two officers stood in the left lane. If a driver was to be detained for
sobriety tests, his vehicle was placed in front of the police car, and
roadblock operations terminated. 1
Another roadblock, operated by the police department in a major
Utah city, draws a sharp contrast to the roadblock described above. The
police department plans roadblocks in conjunction with the City Attorney's office, and a deputy city attorney is present at the roadblock to
monitor conditions. The operational plan for the roadblock is defined
well in advance, after study of areas with high drunk driving arrest
* Judge Davis is a judge with the Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah. Prior to his appointment he had an active career in public law, private practice and legal teaching. He graduated with
the charter class from the J. Reuben Clark Law School in 1976.
** Kenneth R. Wallentine is a candidate for graduation, J. Reuben Clark Law School, !990.
He is a veteran police officer, now working with the firm of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake City.
I. The second co-author participated in such roadblocks operated as part of a "shotgun"
approach to cleaning up the downtown area of a principal Utah city. Other roadblocks were
operated at random, and entirely at the individual officer's discretion. The Chief of Police sometime later considered the practice and prohibited further roadblocks of any type. While this may
well be a worst-case occurrence, several police agencies in Utah continue to operate roadblocks
under questionable circumstances.
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rates. Intrusion is kept to a minimum under guidelines drafted by the
city attorney, after careful consideration of constitutional law. Officers
are specially trained in traffic control and roadblock safety. A mobile
Breathalyzer unit is used at the roadblock site. Front page news stories,
and radio broadcasts, warn the public in advance of the roadblock. 2
Several Utah State trial courts, both District and Circuit, have
considered sobriety roadblocks, resulting in inconsistent decisions. 3
While the extent of analysis and decisive factors in these cases vary
significantly, they do provide some guidance. However, opinions which
lack a detailed reference to the operational facts, guidelines, standards
and policies of the respective law enforcement agencies offer but limited
concrete guidance. Only one of the cases references the Utah Constitution; none address the issue of statutory authorization for roadblocks;
and all the decisions appear to rely exclusively on general fourth
amendment jurisprudence arguments. These decisions parallel the vast
majority of other state courts which also conduct their analysis exclusively in fourth amendment terms. This apparent weak analysis may be
the result of inadequate briefing and lack of articulation of pertinent
legal points by trial counsel.
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals
has had the occasion to analyze the constitutionality of employing roadblocks to detect drivers who are under the influence of alcohol or
drugs.• Nor has either court addressed the issue of roadblocks con2. News stories concerning the roadblock operated by West Valley City were published in
the Deseret News, October 11, 1988, at B-1. Roadblocks were conducted by the West Valley
Police Department on three successive weekends beginning October 15, 1988.
3. Decisions of Utah District and Circuit Courts: State v. Sims, No. 151-D (4th Dist. Ct.
Feb. 24, 1989)(denying a motion to suppress evidence, relying on the minimal intrusion at the
highly structured roadblock, but ignoring extensive briefing of constitutional issues under the Utah
Constitution); West Valley City v. Lujan, No. CRA 84-85 (3rd Dist. Ct., Jun. 6, 1985)(affirming
the decision of the Cir. Ct., upholding the constitutionality of the roadblock); State v. Crary, No.
CRA 83-82, (3rd Dist. Ct. Aug. 3, 1984 )(finding the search and seizure unreasonable and reversed the decision of the 3rd Cir. Ct., Murray Department); Holt v. Schwendiman, No. C842955 (3rd Dist. Ct. Oct. 2, 1984)(in a civil appeal from a driver's license suspension, ruling that
the subject mass roadblock stop constituted an "unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment"); State v. Zisumbo, No. 020534 (2nd Cir. Ct. Jan. 11, 1984)(granting a motion to suppress
all evidence gathered from a roadblock stop and agreeing with the analysis set out by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1984), and the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 466 N.E.2d 346 (1984)).
4. One case concerning a roadblock has been decided by the Utah Court of Appeals, however
the perfunctory opinion was withheld from publication. In State v. Timothy Joe, 870537-CA
(Utah App. Sept. 30, 1988)(opinion withheld from publication), the court invalidated a DUI conviction. The defendant was arrested at a police roadblock. The state failed to file a brief and failed
to appear for oral argument. The court stated that it was not inclined to perform prosecution
counsel's research and briefing duties.
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ducted for administrative purposes. 11 The United States Supreme Court
has never ruled on the constitutionality of a non-permanent, "routine"
sobriety roadblock and thus has not conclusively balanced competing
individual and governmental interests.
It is futile to attempt to proclaim the precise limits within which
all roadblocks may be considered to be constitutionally permissible,
since courts have examined the validity of a roadblock by careful dissection of the operational facts. Practitioners and judges alike in Utah are
required to analyze the constitutionality of administrative and sobriety
checkpoints without benefit of clear precedent. In light of the above, we
suggest the following as a possible analytical approach and model for
proper briefing of the issue in Utah courts (as well as other state's
courts which have called for analysis under their respective state
constitutions).

I.

A.

PROPOSED MoDEL FOR ANALYSIS

State Statutory Considerations

In order to be constitutional a roadblock must be premised upon
state statutory authority, either explicit or implicit. Without such authority the roadblock is per se unconstitutional.

B.

State Constitutional Authority

The constitutionality of a roadblock should also be considered in
light of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

C.

U. S. Constitution Fourth Amendment jurisprudence

A judge or practitioner should then couple her state constitutional
inquiry with that of a federal analysis. Although she may choose to rely
solely upon one approach to the exclusion of the other, it is important
to review the ever-expanding, and often confusing, body of case law
which relies upon fourth amendment considerations to give understanding to current Utah law and how future decisions may diverge from
federal constitution-based analysis. Certain justices of the Utah Supreme Court have indicated that they desire briefs considering both
constitutions. 6 The balance of the discussion details and supports the
5. In a "non-roadblock" case the Utah Supreme Court intimated that a roadblock might be
constitutionally permissible under exigent circumstances. The court did not address sobriety roadblocks. State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269,271, 508 P.2d 534, 536 (1973). Roadblocks which are
operated temporarily to apprehend fleeing felons have long been upheld as reasonable. See, e.g.,
United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1980).
6. See infra notes 66-67.
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above-suggested analytical procedure.

II.

STATE STATUTORY CoNSIDERATIONS

The major question is whether, irrespective of constitutional questions, Utah law enforcement agencies are explicitly or implicitly authorized by state law to establish checkpoints where vehicles are
stopped for sobriety investigation or for other administrative purposes.
The U.S. Supreme Court does not assume that officers are entitled to
conduct any search or seizure unless specifically proscribed by the
fourth amendment; rather statutory authority is required. For example,
in the case of Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 7 the Court
ordered suppression of evidence seized in an unconsented search because the officers lacked statutory authority, even though their actions
would not have violated the fourth amendment. 8 Prosecutors must be
prepared to meet this concern with statutory authority, express or implied. Otherwise, the ground is ripe for suppression of any evidence
gained through a roadblock at the most preliminary stage of the inquiry. The Oregon Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Lane County, stated
that it had often "stressed the need to examine statutory authority and
the limitations imposed by the authority before reaching any constitutional question. " 9

A.

Authority in Utah

There is no express authority found in Utah law which would
sanction sobriety roadblock activities. 10 In order to enforce "Driving
Under the Influence" (DUI) laws, enforcement agencies must rely
upon general police powers providing for public safety and welfare. 11
Some implication of a specific charge to enforce DUI law is found in
the application of the state excise tax on beer, which is intended to
finance the efforts of police to combat the DUI epidemic, as well as to
fund rehabilitation of offenders. 12
Sheriffs and their deputies are granted authority to preserve the
7. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
8. !d. at 77.
9. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 102 n.2, 743 P.2d 692, 695 n.2 (1987).
10. We know of no extant authority under Utah law which would support a finding of
implied power to conduct a roadblock, sobriety or otherwise. We cannot be certain whether the
Utah Supreme Court would expand general police powers to this degree. Nonetheless, implied
authority may well be argued through the empowering statutes for the various enforcement
agencies.
11. See infra notes 12-14.
12. UTAH Com: ANN.§ 32A-1-14 (Supp. 1988).
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peace and make all lawful arrests. 13 Municipal police officers are
granted authority "at all times to preserve the public peace, prevent
crime, detect and arrest offenders . . . protect persons and property,
remove nUisances existing in the public streets, roads and highways,
enforce every law relating to the suppression of offenses, and perform
all duties required of them by ordinance or resolution." 14 The State
Highway Patrol is authorized to enforce the state laws and rules and
regulations governing use of the state highways and to regulate traffic
on all state highways and roads, as well as operate the ports of entry. 111
Further, the powers and duties conferred upon the Commissioner of
Public Safety and members of the Highway Patrol are supplementary
to, and not a limitation upon the powers and duties of other peace officers in the state. 16 The Highway Patrol has comprehensive powers,
while a county sheriff has the least statutory authority, explicit or
implicit. 17
Since Utah appellate courts have not considered a roadblock case,
they have never addressed the issue of "explicit v. implicit" statutory
authority to conduct a roadblock, although other jurisdictions have done
so. States remain divided on the issue. The Oregon Supreme Court, in
the recent case of Nelson v. Lane County, 18 observed "roadblocks are
seizures of the person or the person's effects. For this reason, the authority to conduct roadblocks cannot be implied. Before they search or
seize, executive agencies must have explicit authority from outside the
executive branch." 19 This case was a civil action for a declaratory judgment. The court noted that the authority relied upon by the state police
was not sufficiently specific, leaving open the possibility that a direct
statute would cure the authority deficiency. 20 The Oregon Supreme
Court recognized that enforcement of many criminal laws is conducted
through methods authorized by statutes charging the police agencies
with their general duties. Yet the court also decided two other roadblock cases on the same day ,21 and in both cases, it ordered that evidence obtained at the roadblock be suppressed on the grounds that the
roadblock operation lacked explicit statutory authority.
UTAH Com ANN.~ 17-22-2 (1987)
14. LIAII COllE ANN.§ 10-3-914 (1986).
15. CrAll Com ANN. § 27-10-7 (Supp. 1988).
16. See UTAH Cmn. ANN.§ 27-10-4 (Supp. 1988).
17. UTAH Com. ANN.§§ 27-10-4 to -5, 41-1-17 (1953, 1988 & Supp. 1988).
18. 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987)
19. 304 Or. at 103-04, 743 P.2d at 695 (emphasis added).
20. /d.
21. State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131,743 P.2d 711 (1987); State v. Anderson, 304 Or. 139,
743 P.2d 715 (1987)
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An Oklahoma court, in State v. Smith, 22 was not persuaded by the
state's theory which would sanction roadblock stops on the basis of its
police power to provide for the public safety and welfare. The court
found "no statutory authority which would support, directly or indirectly, the [s ]tate's contention that it has the power to establish checkpoints to inspect all motorists to discern if any are intoxicated. " 23
A middle ground between requiring explicit statutory authority as
opposed to allowing roadblocks under general police powers is found in
the leading case of Ingersoll v. Palmer. 24 There the California Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus which sought to prevent the
California Highway Patrol from operating roadblocks. The court found
that the roadblocks were administered as part of a regulatory administrative scheme authorized by state law, aimed at improving highway
safety through deterring drunk drivers rather than detection of violators.25 This case can be distinguished from Nelson v. Lane County 26
insofar as the California court was able to rely on the administrative
scheme aimed at improving highway safety. Although the administrative or regulatory argument may be convincing, it has no current applicability in the state of Utah. Unlike a number of state legislatures
which have enacted statutes authorizing the implementation of roadblocks27, to date the Utah Legislature has not done so.
Many courts are willing to accept evidence obtained in roadblocks
operated under a presumption of implied statutory authority. An Illinois appellate court stated that
[c ]riminal statutes do contain an implied right of the police to enforce them. While there are state and federal constitutional limitations
on the means of enforcement, these limits are constitutional and not
inherent in every criminal statute .... Absent evidence of some contrary intent, the police should be able to enforce those laws in a constitutional manner. 28

Even though the Oregon Court in Nelson declined to accept an
implied authority theory, it summarized the "implicit authority" argument in the following language:
Much criminal and regulatory law enforcement activity takes place

22. 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
23. /d. at 565.
24. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987).
25. /d.
26. 304 Or. 97, 103-04, 743 P.2d 692, 695-96 (l9R7)
27. See People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 529 n.4, 473 N.E.2d l, 6 n.4, 483 N.Y.S.2d M9, 654
n.4 (1984).
28. People v. Estrada, 68 Ill. App. 3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128, 1D-34 ( l '>79)(crnphasis added).
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pursuant to authority implied from a broad statutory directive. A
broad directive to enforce criminal laws, ... together with the specification of crimes developed by lawmakers, implies authority to undertake tasks necessary to carry out the delegated function. By and large,
agencies of the executive branch are free to carry out their assigned
responsibilities in ways of their own choosing. Making explicit the
manner in which an agency is to accomplish its task falls to the
agency head or that official's designee to instruct or sub-delegate to
subordinate officials. 29

We agree with the Oregon Supreme Court that if no explicit or
implicit authority to conduct the roadblock activity is found, the arrest
must fail. 30

B.

Additional Statutory Concerns

If a court accepts implied authority or finds explicit authority, its
inquiry is not complete. The court must further examine any applicable statutory limitations. Consider the language of the following excerpts from the Utah Code, "[a) peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his
actions." 31 The authority of municipal police officers to effect an arrest
IS likewise statutorily limited:
The members of the police force shall have the power and authority,
without process, to arrest and take into custody any person who shall
commit or threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the officer, or within his view, any breach of the peace, or any offense directly prohibited by the laws of this state or by ordinance. 32

Note that the foregoing statutory restraints may arguably be more
stringent than the fourth amendment, as Utah law requires "reasonable
suspicion" as a necessary prerequisite to making a stop. The fourth
amendment does not always so require. While the United States Supreme Court has required "some quantum of individual suspicion" as a
general prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure, it has ruled
that the fourth amendment imposes no "irreducible requirement" of
such suspicion. The Court has carved out a few established and welldelineated exceptions dealing with airport security, zoning violation en29. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 103, 743 P.2d 692, 695 (1987).
30. Nelson, 304 Or. at 105, 743 P.2d at 696 (citing State v. Atkinson, 298 Or. I, 8-9, 688
P.2d 832, 836-837 (1984)).
31. UTAH Com: ANN. § 77-7-15 (1982).
32. UTAH Com: ANN. § 10-3-915 (1986).
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forcement, border control activity, frisk searches and warrantless administrative searches of commercial property. 33

III.

STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNSIDERATIONS

A. Separate Analyses Under State and Federal Constitutions Are
Judicially Proper
The United States Supreme Court has expressed its respect for
state courts through abstaining from review when practicable. Review
of state court decisions interpreting a right guaranteed under the
United States Constitution is limited to cases where the state court may
have erred. 34 When there are bona fide adequate and separate state
grounds for the result, the federal courts will not act. 311 In the past few
years, the Utah Supreme Court has begun to shape and refine the parameters of protection afforded by the fourth amendment, but it has
never decided a search and seizure case by exclusive reliance on adequate and separate state grounds. Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
sea;-ched, and the person or thing to be seized.

The foregoing language of the Utah Constitution is nearly identical to
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. That may be
one reason why the Utah Supreme Court "has never drawn distinctions
between the protections afforded by the respective constitutional provisions. Rather, the [c ]ourt has a! ways considered the protections afforded
to be one and the same." 36 Judge Greenwood of the Utah Court of
Appeals has also noted that the Utah Supreme Court has decided
search and seizure cases under the United States Constitution's fourth
33. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United Statt·s v Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Schafer, 461
F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
34. See gmerally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
35. /d.
36. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Zimmerman denounces that text as dictum squarely at odds with the tone of footnote number
eight in the majority opinion. The Utah Supreme Court continues to rely on federal precedent
interpreting the fourth amendment in search and seizure cases. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 720 P.2d
1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389-92 (Utah 1986).
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amendment, "eschewing a different standard." 37
That position is further strengthened by reference to the record
respecting the adoption of article I, section 14. There is nothing in the
textual language or in the legislative history of its adoption which
would suggest that the framers intended that it be differently interpreted from the fourth amendment. 38 In addition, there are numerous
criminal cases (not involving search and seizure issues) where the Utah
Supreme Court has concluded that the state constitutional provision has
the same scope of protection as its federal counterpart. 39 In light of
these observations, why should a state constitutional consideration
based on article I, section 14, be part of any analytical model for the
Utah bar? In the following section we propose several practical reasons
for using a separate analysis.
While it is true that the Utah Supreme Court has consistently refused to interpret article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution differently from the fourth amendment, it has not foreclosed that possibility.
The question remains open. 40 The court confirmed in State v. Brooks, 41

37. State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95 n.7 (Utah App. 1987)(citations omitted).
38. Article I, sertion 14 was mentioned only in brief passing in the proceedings and debates
of the State Constitutional Convention. The entire record appears as follows: "The Chairman:
Gentlemen, we will take up section 14. section 14 was read and passed without amendment."
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION 1895, 319 (1898)
39. See Brief f(Jr the State of Utah at 20-21, State v. Babbell. Case No. 21033, (pending
before the Utah Supreme Court)(citing State v. Nelson 725 P 2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986)(admission of hearsay statements not a violation of the right to confrontation under either U.S. CONST.
amend. VI or UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12); State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275 (Utah
1986)(rule that admission of out-of-court statements under the circumstances of the case created no
confrontation problem is the same under federal and state constitution); State v. Banks. 720 P.2d
1380, 1385 (Utah 1986)(interpreting in parallel fashion the speedy trial provisions contained in
UTAH CONST. art. I,§ 12 and U.S. CONST. amend. VI); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261,26567 (Utah 1986)(holding that the "Utah and the federal cruel and unusual punishment provisions
apply to this case in the same fashion", and equal protection analysis is the same under both
constitutions); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985)(holding that, as under federal law,
inventory searches are permitted by UTAH CON ST. art. I, § 14 ); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d
1341, 1343 (Utah 1984 )(in the context of the instant case "article I, li 9 [of the Ctah Constitution I
does not give the defendant more extensive protections than those afforded by the eighth amendment [of the federal constitution]); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-06 (lJtah 1984)(ineffective assistance of counsel analysis same under UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 and U.S. CO;.,'ST.
amend. VI); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 n.5 (Utah 1984) rert. denied, 466 U.S. 942
(1984) ("[The Utah Supreme Court] recognizes no distinrtion between the protection against ex
post facto laws provided by the Utah and the United States Constitutions"); McNair v. Hayward,
666 P.2d 321, .\23 (Utah 1983)(the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. CON ST. amend. V
and of the UTAH CONST. art I. § 12 "have the same content")).
40. See, e.g., State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986)(noting that what the appropriate remedy might be if the defendant has argued that the officer's artion violated his rights under
article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution is an open question).
41. 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981 ).
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that a "state may construe its own constitution more narrowly than the
federal constitution even though the provisions involved may be similar."42 That principle paved the way for the court to announce that the
construction of a state constitutional provision was not controlled by the
federal court's construction and application of its federal counterpart. 43
In civil cases, the court has actively looked to the Utah Constitution to
decide a variety of issues. 44

B. State Constitutions May Provide Greater Protections Against Unreasonable Searches
Judge Billings, in her dissenting opmwn in State v. Larocco, 411
recognized the need for a state constitutional analysis in the vehicle
search and seizure area. She observed that "[ s]tate courts responding to
the confusing and restrictive new federal interpretations are relying on
an analysis of their own search and seizure provisions to expand constitutional protection beyond those mandated by the fourth amendment,
often directly avoiding applicable United States Supreme Court
precedent. " 46
In a recent opinion the Utah Supreme Court announced its interest in the applicability of a Utah Constitution, article I, section 14 argument by stating that "[i]ndeed, choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate
method for insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal
courts.'' 47
42. /d. at 539.
43. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme Court stated
[a]lthough article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same general
fundamental principles as are incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, our construction and application of article I, section 24 are not controlled by the federal court's
construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case law developed under
the fourteenth amendment may be persuasive in applying article I, section 24, but that
law is not binding so long as we do not reach a result that violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
/d. (citations omitted). It must be stressed that the language of article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution is dissimilar, although
these provisions embody the same general principle.
44. See generally Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984); Johnston v. Stoker, 685 P.2d
539, 540-43 (Utah 1984); Timpanogos Planning & Water Management Agency v. Central Utah
Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 568-70 (Utah 1984); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis,
685 P.2d 515, 520-22 (Utah 1984); KUTV v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 521 (Utah 1983). See also
Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Constitution, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 320-21.
45. 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987).
46. /d. at 104 (Billings, J., dissenting).
47. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988)(citations omitted).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the wisdom of a separate
body of state constitutional law. In Michigan v. Long, 48 Justice
O'Connor noted that "[i]t is fundamental that state courts be left free
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. " 49 The
New Jersey Supreme Court has noted several compelling reasons for
finding that their state constitution is a more appropriate vehicle to resolve questions concerning search and seizure issues. The court specifically opined that local issues are best resolved through state constitutional analysis. 50 The landmark case of Delaware v. Prouse/ 1 often
cited in support of roadblocks, acknowledged that highway safety and
law enforcement is primarily a local concern. 52
In many cases, state constitutions may provide a greater limitation
on the government than do the parallel provisions in the United States
Constitution. State courts have the latitude to look to their respective
constitutions. 53 A growing number of states are deciding roadblock
cases exclusively on independent state grounds. A New Jersey appellate
court stated in State v. Kirk 54 that "structural differences in the state
and federal constitutions and matters of particular state interest or local
concern are two factors to be considered in developing an independent
body of state constitutional law." 55 The court in Kirk found that the
subject roadblock was unconstitutional since it rested too heavily on the
discretion of the field officers. The well-reasoned opinion was rendered
on state constitutional grounds exclusively, not on federal constitutional
grounds. 56 A recent New Hampshire roadblock decision also relied
solely on state constitutional grounds to find a roadblock
unconstitutional. 57
In addition, the Washington Supreme Court recently found a sobriety checkpoint illegal based on independent state grounds. The court
stated that "[ w ]hen parties allege violation of rights under both the
United States and Washington Constitutions, this court will first independently interpret and apply the Washington Constitution in order,
48. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
49. !d. at 1041 (citations omitted).
50. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 358-72, 450 A.2d 952, 962, 969 (1982).
51. 440 u.s. 648 (1979).
52. !d.
53. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); State v. Williams, 93 N J. 39, 459
A.2d 641 (1983) See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Developments in the Law-Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324 ( 1982).
54. 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
55. !d. at pinpoint, 493 A.2d at 1274.
56. !d.
57. State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985).
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among other concerns, to develop a body of independent jurisprudence,
and because consideration of the United States Constitution first would
be premature. " 118 The court went on to say that "the textual language
of article 1, section 7 [of the Washington Constitution], provides greater
protection to individual pnvacy interests than the [f)ourth
[a]mendment." 119
State constitutional grounds were also at the foundation of a recent
Idaho decision. In State v. Henderson, 60 the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a denial of a suppression order after scrutiny of the roadblock
under the Idaho Constitution, which is identical to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. The court considered IDAHO
CoDE § 19-621, which authorizes roadblocks to apprehend persons reasonably believed to be in violation of Idaho law, and found reasonable
suspicion to be a condition precedent to the use of a roadblock. Justice
Huntley, writing for the majority, stated that the court reached its conclusion solely on the grounds of the state constitution. 61
Nearly every court which has addressed the constitutionality of
roadblock stops has adopted a balancing test involving the factors of
public interest against the right of an individual to personal security,
free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officers. In Utah
the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice likewise
probably would be judged by balancing its intrusion on the citizen's
article 1 § 14 interests against its promotion of legitimate state interests.
One can make a compelling argument that the state constitutional analysis is a "more appropriate vehicle" to resolve the competing state and
personal interests. Regardless, the prominent balancing test advanced in
Brown v. Texas 62 is equally applicable to a state or federal constitutional analysis. While the majority of the arguments rely on fourth
amendment cases and concerns, most are also applicable to a state constitutional consideration, since the competing interests are the same.

C. A Standard for State Constitutional Review of Sobriety Roadblocks and an Incentive for Its Use
In formulating an argument under a state or federal constitutional
analysis, a practitioner or court may look to a growing number of Utah
cases enunciating a reasonable suspicion standard for a "criminal inves58. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775, 776 (1988)(emphasis
added).
59. /d.
60. 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988).
61. Id.

62. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See infra note 78.
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tigative stop." 63 Once this review is completed, argument may be advanced respecting constitutionality under the Utah and United States
Constitutions. Similar though they may be, one cannot make the error
of proceeding to a federal analysis without examining the state constitution. The Mississippi Supreme Court recently underscored that "[a]
procedure may be perfectly in accord with the United States Constitution and yet run afoul of state constitutional or statutory
requirements." 64
Justice Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court has observed that
the Supreme Court has not yet undertaken independent state constitutional analysis of remedies for improper searches. 611 We believe that it is
fair to say that the Utah Supreme Court has traditionally followed the
federal lead on search and seizure cases; indeed, it has not departed
dramatically from the growing body of federal law in its analysis. 66
While Utah has developed no independent or separate body of
state constitutional search and seizure law, both Justices Durham and
Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court have expressed a willingness
to seriously consider an analytical approach premised on article I, section 14 arguments. 67 Justice Zimmerman has stated that "[ t ]he federal
law as it currently exists is certainly not the only permissible interpretation of the search and seizure protections contained in the Utah Con63. The concept of a reasonable suspicion standard was advanced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 ( 1968). The Court found that a limited frisk search was justified where a "police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity is afoot." For further Supreme Court discussion of a reasonable suspicion test see
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). For Utah State Supreme Court cases discussing reasonable suspicion standards see generally State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987);
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986); State
v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983); State v.
Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984); State v. Torres, 508 P.2d 534 (Utah 1973). For Utah Court
of Appeals cases see State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. 34 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P 2d 2 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1988); State v.
Bairrl, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988); State v.
Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987).
64. Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294, 297 (Miss. 1986).
65. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v.
Mendoza, 748 P 2d 181, 187 (Utah 1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
66. See supra note 42.
67. See, e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
1986)(Durham, J., concurring on Utah Constitution, article I & V grounds); State v. Mendoza,
748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987)(Durham, J., dissenting); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah
1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring); American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah
1985)(Durham, J., for the majority, relies upon the Utah Constitution's self-incrimination provision, articles I & XII; Zimmerman, J., concurring suggests an article I, section 14 analysis).
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stitution. " 68 Such an analysis may extend the scope of individual protection against unreasonable searches and seizures beyond that accorded
by the fourth amendment.
Writing for the majority in State v. Earl, 69 Justice Durham noted
that neither the state nor the defendant had discussed or relied independently on article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. She further
noted that despite the court's willingness to independently interpret the
Utah Constitution in other areas of law, "the analysis of state constitutional issues in criminal appeals continues to be ignored." 70 Justice
Durham concluded that "[i]t is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this
Court on relevant state constitutional questions." 71 Justice Zimmerman
was equally emphatic in State v. Hygh, 72 stating that "[s]ound argument may be made in favor of positions at variance with the current
federal law respecting both the scope of the individual's right to be free
from warrantless searches and seizures and the remedy for any violation of that right. " 73
In light of these frequent announcements of receptivity, any analytical approach, particularly from a defense perspective, must seriously
consider a state constitutional analysis. Even with these judicial invitations, counsel have not seriously considered and articulated arguments
premised on state constitutional grounds.
Practitioners who wish to advance arguments premised on article
I, section 14 are presented with two additional decisions; "the choice of
when to raise state constitutional issues, and the choice of theoretical
model of analysis and review."
In State v. Larocco, 74 the majority agreed with Judge Billing's
dissenting opinion on the narrow issue that any departure from a
fourth amendment analysis approach should be announced by the Utah
Supreme Court, not the Utah Court of Appeals. 711 More recently, however, in State v. Shamblin, 76 the defendant analyzed his defense under
both article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth
amendment. Judge Orme, of the Utah Court of Appeals, stated "[ w ]e
need not accept defendant's invitation to address his rights under our
state constitution as we hold that the federal Fourth Amendment [sic]
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah 1985).
716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).
/d. at 806.

!d.
711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1984).

/d. at 272.
742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987).
/d. at 95 n.7, 103.
763 P. 2d 425 (Utah App. 1988).
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requires suppression of the evidence in question." 77 The reader is left
with the impression that but for the disposition of the case under the
fourth amendment, that the Utah Court of Appeals may have reached
the state constitutional analysis in its decision. If our reading of
Shamblin is accurate, it manifests a slight departure from the announcement in Larocco.
Even more recently in the case of State v. Johnson 78 , the Utah
Court of Appeals declined to entertain a state constitutional argument
because the defendant had failed to brief or argue a state constitutional
issue at the trial level. It appears that the court reached its decision
squarely on the preservation issue. However, there is intimation that,
absent the preservation defect, the court may have reached the state
constitutional issue. The policy decision announced in Larocco to refrain from deciding a case on independent state grounds until such
course is announced by the Utah Supreme Court, may be weakening.
In Johnson the court resorted to a preservation argument in avoiding
the state constitutional issue, while it would have been simpler to cite
the policy decision of Larocco. However, such distinctions may also be
fairly attributed to the differences in the various judicial panels of the
Court of Appeals. In absence of clarification, we must recommend that
state constitutional arguments be raised at every level of the case.
Next, even if the reviewing court were to reach the merits in a
roadblock case where the state constitutional arguments were well articulated and adequately argued, it is unclear which of the various
models of analysis would then be applied. 79 That choice is dependent
upon the view of the Utah Supreme Court respecting the roles of federal and state constitutions. In that regard, the court has sent some
inconsistent and mixed signals. In civil cases where the court has independently interpreted the Utah Constitution to reach its decisions the
analytical methodology does not appear to be entirely harmonious. One
author has suggested that the court has failed to develop " ... a consistent approach for cases in which both state and federal constitutional
claims are made. Some cases fully examine differences between the
Utah and United States [Constitution] provisions; others rely exclusively on federal law although state claims were presented." 80 The
77. /d. at 426 n.2.
78. 771 P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989).
79. Legal scholars have identified three models of review: the dual sovereignty or coequal
model, the primacy model, and the interstitial or supplementary model. See generally Developments in the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324,
1356-59 (1982).
80. Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 UTAH L. REV.
319, 321.
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Utah Supreme Court has never adopted a model because it has never
been properly presented with the question in a criminal case. The ultimate choice of model may have direct bearing on the decision.
While references to article I, section 14 arguments are principally
in footnotes and dissenting opinions, we can fairly reach one conclusion:
a nominal or mere invocation of the state constitution is simply insufficient. The Utah Supreme Court recently announced in State v. Lafferty, 81 that "[a)s a general rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state
and federal constitutions is briefed. " 82 In that respect the court has adhered to the principle of judicial restraint by limiting its analysis to the
issues raised at trial and on appeal. That position is consistent with
previous decisions and is soundly reasoned; appellate courts ought to
hesitate from delving into virgin territory in the absence of helpful and
well-researched models which have been advanced by counsel. Undifferentiated state and federal claims or the mere citation of the Utah and
federal constitutions in conjunction with an argument grounded in federal constitutional principles will ordinarily lead the court to decide the
case under the federal constitution.
While we urge a state constitutional analysis as an important feature of our analytical model, we certainly offer no prediction regarding
its ultimate reception or rejection at the appellate level. Search and
seizure decisions are fact intensive; they turn not only on the application of the correct analytical approach, but equally important, on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to
give sufficient guidance respecting an article I, section 14 analysis, although it has cited with approval the general state constitutional argument approach found in State v. jewitt. 83 In that decision the Vermont
Supreme Court takes counsel to task for failing to employ their state
constitution, and gives an able primer on state constitutional argument.

81. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).
82. /d. at 1247 n.5. See also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1257 n.2 (Utah 1987); State v.
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-6 (Utah 1986); cf State v. Hygh 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah
1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(arguments for different analyses under the state and federal
constitutions should be considered if made); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App.
1989).
83. 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985), cited in State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803,806 (Utah 1986).
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FouRTH AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVES

A. Roadblocks Are Seizures Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and Thus Must Be Subjected to Fourth Amendment
Criteria
It is well-established that roadblocks and checkpoints are seizures
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 84 After all the above concerns have been addressed, the roadblock must still meet the requirements for a lawful search and seizure under the fourth amendment.
The traditional test generally demands both that a warrant be obtained
and that there be probable cause. 8 1j The Supreme Court continues to
stress that legitimate excusal of the warrant requirement does not affect
the probable cause requirement. 86 There are few established exceptions
to the probable cause requirement. Among these are "Terry-type" stop
and frisk detentions, border searches, administrative inspections, inspections of heavily regulated enterprises, airport security checks, and inspection of ocean-going vessels in U.S. waters. 87
It is probable that roadblocks pass muster under the doctrine of
Carroll v. United States 88 as a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Carroll established that an officer can conduct a warrantless
search of a vehicle if "it is not practical to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved .... " 89 The Court looked ahead to potential abuse of the newly-formed doctrine, however, and cautioned:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a [government] agent

were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding
84. See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. I, 16 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979).
85. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973)(Powell, J., concurring).
86. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1985).
87. In 1968 the Supreme Court articulated a lower "reasonable suspicion" standard in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). Border searches have been upheld as valid to detect undocumented
aliens. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 523 (1976). Inspections to detect violations of
health codes, building codes and industrial hygiene standards (for certain industries) have been
allowed. See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)(building code inspections held 'alid without particularized suspicion of violation); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594 (1981 )(holding warrantless general inspection of mines to not require particular suspicion);
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)(by virtue of Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, Labor Department inspectors may enter and inspect any work area subject to the Act's
provisions). In McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978), the court upheld magnetometer
(metal detector) inspection of persons entering a courtroom since the search was reasonably necessary to ensure security, and was not a subterfuge to gather information for criminal prosecution.
The unfettered stopping and boarding of ships in U.S. coastal waters has been upheld in United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983). The Court compared the inspections to those
of highly regulated industries, such as liquor distilleries and firearms manufacturers.
88. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
89. /d. at 153.
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liquor .. [T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the
public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or
search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to
search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise. 90

It is critical to recall that the fourth amendment protects "people,
not places." 91 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the restraint required in
exercising the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 92 stating, "the Carroll doctrine does
not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile there must be probable cause for the search." 93

B. Sobriety Roadblocks Are Subject to a Balancing of Interest Analysis in Determining Constitutionality
Because sobriety roadblocks are not based upon probable cause,
we must examine the acceptable deviations from the probable cause requirement. Obviously, a roadblock is not similar to established probable
cause exceptions such as heavily regulated enterprises, permanent border crossings, boarding of ship on the seas, or health and safety code
enforcement. While some tenuous arguments might be made by analogy, we believe that roadblocks do not fit the criteria and formulae
which established these particular probable cause exceptions. We conclude rather, that roadblocks must be viewed under an interest-balancing analysis. In automobile search cases over the last few decades the
Supreme Court has adopted the interest-balancing approach, which is
much less rigorous than traditional fourth amendment analysis. 94 However, the Court has not stated that it would employ a balancing test in
all types of automobile searches. In Brown v. Texas, 911 a seminal case
advancing the balancing analysis in automobile searches, the Court said
it would apply the balancing test to "seizures that are less intrusive
than a traditional arrest." 96
The Brown Court outlined the three stage balancing analysis as
follows. The first step considers the gravity of public concerns served
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
searches
States v.
great as
95.
96.

/d. at 153-54.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
413 U.S. 266 (1973).
/d. at 269.
The Court has been consistent in applying the balancing analysis when automobile
and seizures are at issue. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)(expectation of privacy in an automobile is not as
that in a personal residence); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
/d. at 50.
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by the seizure as demonstrated by specific, objective facts. Second, the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest must be considered. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the severity of the intrusion on individual liberty will be weighed. 97 If sobriety roadblocks
are to stand under the fourth amendment, it must be shown that they
effectively advance a significant public concern, and that the intrusiveness is reasonable.

C. The Public Interest in Detecting Intoxicated Drivers is of Sufficient Magnitude to Warrant Extraordinary Enforcement Approaches
Without hesitation, any court may take judicial notice of the national concern with the drunk driver. Figures in the pages of newspapers and on the evening news illustrate the epidemic gravity of the
problem. Best estimates place the number of persons killed in alcoholrelated traffic accidents at 25,000 annually. 98 Well over an additional
half million are injured. 99 Property damage is estimated to exceed five
billion dollars annually .10° Congress has acted to withhold federal highway funds from those states failing to enact strict DUI enforcement
provisions. 101 The Supreme Court cited the problem of drunk driving
in South Dakota v. Neville, 102 stating "[t]he situation underlying this
case-that of the drunk driver-occurs with tragic frequency on our
nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well-documented and needs no detailed recitation here. " 103 Justice Blackmun,
writing in Perez v. Campbell, 104 noted that the "slaughter on the highways exceeds the death toll of all our wars." 105 Several state courts
have unequivocally held the state interest to be compelling and overwhelmingly in favor of the state. 106
Data compiled by the Utah Department of Public Safety support
the fact that Utah is not immune from the plague of drunk drivers. 107
97. !d. at 50-51; See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-83 (1975).
98. H. R. REP. No. 867, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1982).
99. Alcohol, Drugs & Driving, Hearing to Examine What Effect Alcohol and Drugs Have
on Individuals While Driving, Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1982).
100. Lauter, The Drunk Driving Blitz, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
101. 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1982).
102. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
103. !d. at 558 (holding that refusal to submit to a blood alcohol level test may be introduced
at trial as evidence of guilt).
104. 402 U.S. 637 (1971 ).
105. !d. at 657 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(footnote omitted).
106. See, e.g., State v. Superior Ct., 143 Az. 45, 48, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1985); State v.
McLaughlin, 471 N.E.Zd 1125, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
107. UTAH DEP'T OF Pus. SAFETY, 1986 Utah Traffic Accident Summary (1987); UTAH
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The gravity of concern in Utah is evidenced by the extensive history of
legislative reform aimed at "toughening" the drunk driving statutes.
Because of citizen demands, intense lobbying efforts and public outrage,
the legislature within the last decade has significantly increased the
amount of fines, added a victim restitution program, reduced the bloodalcohol presumptive level, provided for an assessment to fund educational activities, added an "implied consent" statute, and provided for
mandatory incarceration. In the 1988 legislative session, Senate Bill
121 was passed, requiring an additional fee to be imposed to fund a
Victim Advocate Board for DUI offenders. 108
Numerous anti-drunk driving groups with catchy, aggressive acronyms have sprung into being in the past decade. Moreover, membership is growing at a rate generally unparalleled in civic interest
groups. 109 Public awareness is at a new high. Pressure on law enforcement administrators may well be a reason for increased used of roadblocks. Nearly half the states use roadblocks to some degree in combating drunk drivers.no Furthermore, supplemental incentive funds are

DEP'T OF Pus. SAFETY, Utah Traffic Accident Summary (1988); UTAH Dt:P'T. OF Pus. SAFETY,
UTAH TRAFFIC ACCIDENT SUMMARY (1989). These reports show that in 1986, I 04 of 312 traffic
fatalities were alcohol-related. In 1987, 82 of the 297 traffic fatalities were alcohol-related. In
1988, 1OS of the 297 traffic fatalities were alcohol-related.
108. In 1982, UTAH CoDE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953) was amended to establish the fine for a
first offense DUI conviction at $299 (removing the $100-$299 discretionary fine). UTAH Com:
ANN. § 41-6-44 (1982). This section was again amended in 1986 to allow the court to sentence a
DUI offense as any other Class B misdemeanor, punishable by incarceratinn for up to 6 months,
together with the imposition of a fine up to $1,000, or both. UTAH Com: ANN.§ 41-6-44 (1988).
A Class A offense (involving personal injury) carries a fine of up to $2,500, together with incarceration up to one year and/or both. The mandatory minimum jail term of 2 days (10 days for a
second conviction and 30 days fore a subsequent conviction) was added to§ 41-6-44(4) in 1982.
The Victim Restitution Fund, carrying an assessment of $100, was created in 1983. In 1979, a
comprehensive treatment bill was passed, requiring an assessment of $150 for first-time offenders
and an amount equal to the maximum fine for a Class B misdemeanor for repeat offenders. These
monies are used to fund DUI rehabilitation programs. The court was also given the power to
order reimbursement for social agencies involved in treating the convicted DUI driver. Utah added
an "implied consent" law in 1981. Motorists driving within the state arc deemed to have given
consent to a blood-alcohol test, or tests, requested by police. Refusal resuhs in automatic suspension of driving privileges, with no provision for a limited license. Utah belongs to the Driver's
License Compact, extending the suspension to member states.
109. See Insurance Information Institute, Drunk Driving in America, reprinted in Bus.
WK., Oct. 17, 1983, at 176. Groups such as MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Drivers), SADD
(Students Against Drunk Drivers), RID (Remove Intoxicated Drivers), have swelled in ranks,
undertaking projects such as monitoring of court sentencing for convicted offenders, public information campaigns, civil actions, pledges not to drive after drinking. In Utah, REDDI (Report
Every Drunk Driver Immediately) is promoted through the Utah Highway Patrol, citizen band
radio clubs, local police and community service agencies.
110. 21 states are using sobriety roadblocks. NTSB, SAFETY STUDY-DETERRENCE OF
DRUNK DRIVING: THE RoLE OF SoBRIETY CHECKPOINTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REvOCATIONS, REP. SS-84-01 at 5-6 (1984)(Doc/US TD 1.127:84/01).
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available to those states which implement procedures recommended by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which include
the use of sobriety roadblocks.m

D. The Efficacy of Roadblocks zn Detection, Apprehension and Deterrence of the Drinking Driver
One author has characterized roadblocks as being "woefully deficient" in solving the DUI problem. 112 On the other side, in State v.
Superior Court, 113 the Arizona Supreme Court found that the state had
demonstrated a decrease in DUI accidents due to the use of Arizona
Department of Public Safety roadblocks. A decrease of approximately
3.5% (at the Christmas season, traditionally a time of increase) was
classified by the court as significant. 11 " However, in what is perhaps
the most exhaustive scholarly treatment of DUI roadblocks to date,
Professors James B. Jacobs and Nadine Strossen examined extensive
statistical evidence and concluded that the evidence supporting the efficacy of sobriety checkpoints is, at best, inconclusive. 115
Indeed, the number of potential offenders deterred by roadblocks is
debatable. For example, one court concluded that "common sense
alone" was sufficient to conclude that roadblocks are effective deterrent
measures. 116 In Delaware, the lieutenant governor has credited highway patrol sobriety roadblocks with a 23% decrease in alcohol related
fatalities. 117 On the other hand, in a recent Arizona case, the court
noted that of 5,763 vehicles stopped at the subject roadblock, only 14
drivers were arrested for DUI (a mere 1 out of every 412 vehicles). 118
Ill. 23 C.F.R. § 1309 (1984).
112. Comment, Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks: Constitutional in Light of Delaware v.
Prouse?, 28 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 813, 833 (1984).
113. 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984).
114. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 48-49, 691 P.2d at 1076-77.
115. Jacobs & Strossen, Mass Investigation Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 595, 638-45
(1985).
116. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 287, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985). The court conceded that the apprehension rate of roadblocks might not be as high as that of traditional detection
methods, nonetheless opining that the deterrent potential was great.
117. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY NEWSl.t:TTt:R, Oct.-Dec. 1983, at 3 (quoting Delaware Lt. Gov. Michael Castle). Castle's remarks are
unsupported by any type of empirical data, other than to show that alcohol-related fatalities did
decrease in the year following adoption of the federally recommended strict DUI law package. It
would he unreasonable to consider the roadblocks as other than just one factor in the decrease;
increased public cooperation with the police, heightened traditional enforcement, aggressive patrol,
alternative transportation programs, and even increased use of seatbelts might well have also contributed to the decrease.
118. State ex rei. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. I, 2, 663 P.2d 992, 993 (1983).
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Such minimal success can hardly be expected to deter offenders. A
study by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of multiple roadblocks in two different programs concluded that no deterrent
effect was demonstrated. 119 However, France and Sweden have used
roadblocks for over five years and have found a significant deterrent
effect. 120 After reviewing such inconsistent data it seems fair, at least at
this point, to agree with Jacobs and Strossen in characterizing empirical roadblock data as "inconclusive" .121
The agency employing roadblocks as a DUI enforcement method
should be prepared to offer data, if available, showing local efficacy in
apprehension, or at least deterrence. However, mere inconclusive data
alone should not prevent the use of roadblocks. No court has even attempted to construct a standard against which empirical data should be
measured. Our courts should not be transformed into centers of statistical accountancy to supplant their role in serving law and justice.

E. The "Neutral Criteria" Examined: Limited and Controlled Intrusion Upon the Motorist's Liberty in the Administration of
Roadblocks
We now turn to the final element of the balancing analysis: the
severity of intrusion upon the motorist's fourth amendment interest.
Many courts have proceeded directly to this facet of the analysis, disregarding completely the first two steps, or taking judicial notice of their
fulfillment. In Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, 122 the Supreme Court
weighed both objective and subjective intrusion in considering the constitutionality of a permanent immigration checkpoint. The elements of
objective intrusion include the stop itself, the physical inspection, and
the questioning of the motorist. 123 Generally, the objective intrusion at
a roadblock will be minimal. Most roadblocks require only a few min119. NAT'!. Hll;HWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 3 TRAFFIC SAFETY EVALUATION RESEARCH REVIEW 5, Nov.-Dec. 1984. The same review cites a major, prolonged roadblock program
in New Jersey where one DUI arrest resulted from every 5.2 man-hours of enforcement. Frankly,
the authors cannot accept that a single patrol officer, at the critical hours of the night, could not
apprehend more than 1 DUI offender. Such apprehension would be made through observation of
objective observation of driving patterns, and the stop based on the less intrusive individualized
suspicion, not random roadblocks. This study directly refutes an earlier report of higher levels of
efficiency. See NTSB REP. SS-84-01, supra note 109 at 5-6 (1984 ).
120. NTSB REP. 55-84-01, supra note 109 at 5-6. Sweden has adopted statutes specifically
authorizing sobriety roadblocks. This measure is credited with a level of only 2o/o of weekend
drivers in Sweden having a blood alcohol level greater than .05% (compared with 13% in the
United States).
121. Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 114.
122. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
123. /d. at 558 (1976).
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utes of the motorist's time. 12 • Usually the officer speaks momentarily to
the driver and views the interior of the vehicle, checking for alcohol
containers and weapons. 1211 Given the momentary nature of the roadblock, it is unlikely that any roadblock would be invalidated on the sole
basis of objective intrusion. 126
The restraint of subjectivity by officers in roadblocks is critical.
Nearly every case assessing the constitutionality of a roadblock addresses the "neutral target criteria" aspect of the roadblock operation,
and bases the decision on the presence and comprehensiveness of the
operational formula designed to promote objectivity. One court bifurcated its consideration of the subjective intrusion into the element of
fright and surprise, and the element of individual officer discretion. 127
Both are considered in the Kansas Supreme Court opinion, State v.
Deskins. 128 This decision is cited often, and seems to be the emerging
authoritative case. 129 There the Kansas court set forth thirteen nonexclusive factors to be considered in arriving at a neutral criteria which
would reduce the subjective intrusion to an acceptable minimum. These
include:
1) the degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the field;
2) the location designated for the roadblock;
3) the time and duration of the roadblock;
4) standards set by superior officers;
5) advance notice to the public at large;
6) advance warning to the individual motorist approaching the
roadblock;
7) maintenance of safety conditions;
8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the operation of the
roadblock;
9) average length of time each motorist Is detained;
124. See generally Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 491, 497 A.2d 903, 906 (1984)(fifteen to
thirty second detention); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 47, 691 P.2d 1073, 1077
(1984)(five to twenty second stops); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984)(two to three minute stops).
125. Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 497 A.2d 903, 907 (1984); State v. MrLaughlin, 471
N.E.2d 1125, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). But cf People v. Bartley, 125 Ill. App. 3d 575, 466
N.E.2d 346, 348 (1984)(use of flashlight to inspect interior of vehicle was one of the elements
making the roadblock a "significant degree of intrusion").
126. Any detention beyond the initial contact gives rise to further probable cause issues. It is
not our intent to treat such issues in this paper.
127. State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1139 (Ind. App. 1984).
128. State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983).
129. See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Kirk, 202 N.J. Super 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1280 (1985); see also State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d
314 (Iowa 1980). All cite State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983), with
approval.
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10)
11)
12)
13)
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physical factors surrounding the location, type, and method
of operation;
the availability of a less intrusive means for combating the
problem;
the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and,
any other relevant circumstances which might bear on the
test.l3o

The Deskins court did not require that each factor be resolved in
favor of the state. 131 Certain factors are crucial, such as the effectiveness
and the degree of fear by motorists generated by the roadblock operation. These are among factors included in other courts' construction of
permissible operational formulae. 132 Each court has placed particular
emphasis on the first factor, requiring controls on the discretion left to
the field officer. Unbridled discretion certainly could lead to an intolerable level of subjective intrusion. In State v. Kirk, the court singled out
the discretionary factor, observing that "participation of command or
supervisory authority in selecting the time and place based on reasonable evidence of social utility is an essential constitutional ingredient and
is necessary to satisfy the objection that the traveller not be subject to
the discretion of the official in the field. " 133
While there may be greater focus on a specific set of factors, no
single factor is determinative. As with any balancing test, application to
130. Deskins, 234 Kan. at 536, 673 P.2d at 1185.
131. !d.
132. See, e.g., State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980)(establishin~ a four
part formula: 1) selection of site for safety considerations and visibility to oncoming motorists; 2)
adequate warning devices, with proper illumination at night, informing motorists of the nature of
the impending intrusion; 3) uniformed officers and marked police vehicles to establish the certainty
of authority and police power of the community; and, 4) a pre-determination by policy-making
administrators of the roadblock time, location, and procedures to be employed, pursuant to carefully formulated standards and neutral criteria); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 501, 497 A.2d 903,
911 (1984)(offering a similar four part formula: 1) careful circumscription of field officer's discretion by clear objective regulations previously established by high level administrative officials: 2)
approaching motorists are given adequate warning of the roadblock ahead; 3) the likelihood of
fear, apprehension or surprise is reduced by a display of legitimate police authority at the roadblock; and, 4) vehicles are stopped on a systematic, non-random basis to show drivers that they are
not being singled out for arbitrary reasons); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137,
143, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983)(deciding this case and fourteen companion cases suggesting the
following: 1) the inconvenience to the motorist be minimized; 2) the selection procedure not be
arbitrary; 3) safety of motorists be assured; 4) the roadblock must be systematic, not random; and,
5) there must be a pre-arranged plan established by supervisory staff); State v. Tourtillott, 289
Or. 845, 864-65, 618 P.2d 423, 433 (1980), cert. denied, 451 V.S. 972 (1981)(articulating their
test as: 1) an important government interest at stake; 2) consideration of the physical and psychological intrusive nature of the roadblock procedure; 3) the efficiency of the roadblock in reaching
the desired goal; and 4) the degree of discretion vested in the field officers).
133. State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div.
1985)(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
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a particular set of facts may prove difficult. 134 With no clear controlling
authority and a multitude of factors to consider, the only avenue is to
examine the facts and circumstances of each case. As stated by the Supreme Court, there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." 1311 Law enforcement officials
and prosecutors who choose to employ roadblocks may use the foregoing factors in planning their operation. The roadblock which addresses
every minutia of constitutional law may never come to pass. Someone
will always be prepared to be a Monday-morning quarterback. As the
Supreme Court has noted "[a] creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative
means by which the objectives of the police might have been
accomplished. " 136
V.

CoNSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE SoBRIETY RoADBLOCKS:
CoNCLUSION AND SuGGESTED APPROACH

It is vital to curb the lamentable and needless deaths on Utah's
highways attributable to drinking drivers. Without question there are
soundly-reasoned and compelling constitutional arguments, both state
and federal, which can be advanced for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests and for an individual's interest in being free from
intrusions on fundamental constitutional rights. On balance, assuming
a properly administered roadblock, we believe that the gravity of the
well-documented public concern in Utah and the degree to which the
roadblock procedure facilitates detection and abatement of drunken
drivers outweigh the minimal level of interference with individual liberties. It is critical to note that we do not conclude that any extant roadblock procedures now being utilized by law enforcement agencies in
Utah can withstand state or federal constitutional scrutiny. Without
doubt, the first roadblock described in the introduction would be struck
down under even the weakest constitutional examination. The second
may or may not withstand the full gauntlet of state and federal constitutional inquiry.
We have suggested, as one facet of any rigorous analytical approach, that roadblock activity be analyzed under article I, section 14
standards of the Utah Constitution. Whether such analysis will carry
the day remains to be seen, but with frequent reminders from members
134.
U.S. 972
135.
136.

State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845, 864-65, 618 P.2d 423, 433 (1980), cert. denied, 451
(1981 ).
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985).
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of the Utah Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Utah's own
constitutional provisions, it cannot be ignored. Justice Zimmerman is
eagerly optimistic that an independent state constitutional analysis will
result in a simplification of fourth amendment jurisprudence, which, in
his words is a "labyrinth of rules built upon a series of contradictory
and confusing rationalizations and distinctions." 137 While not everyone
shares that enthusiasm, few would fault his contention that state constitutional arguments should not be foreclosed from consideration by the
court's unanalyzed acceptance of the federal position. 138
Despite the multitude of obstacles to overcome in constructing a
constitutionally permissible roadblock, it is fair to conclude that a sobriety roadblock is constitutional if properly administered. 139 Careful
planning and execution will almost assuredly prepare the roadblock to
pass constitutional muster. We support without reservation the criteria
advanced by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Deskins. 140 The
element of efficiency of roadblocks in a particular jurisdiction can be
established only through empirical study. Support may be given to the
concept by citation of successes in other regions.
Some consideration may be given to an additional element of preparation-the administrative area search warrant. This type of warrant
was authorized by the Supreme Court to allow area searches seeking
building code violations. 141 One California court has suggested the area
warrant as a precedent to a sobriety roadblock. 142 An affidavit seeking
an area search warrant should set forth the elements considered in this
article; statutory police power to enforce the subject law, evidence of a
local problem, and belief that the roadblock will be effective. Further,
the operational plans should be contained in the application, so that the
court may give prior review of the neutrality of the criteria designed to
reduce intrusiveness. The novelty of this approach should not deter the
dedicated prosecutor.
Because of the intricacies involved in balancing of interests, roadblocks must be approached on a case-by-case basis. Although a small
number of courts have held sobriety roadblocks to be per se unconstitutional, we do not find their reasoning persuasive. A majority of the
courts finding a particular roadblock unconstitutional have suggested or

137. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 267, 271-72 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v.
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987)(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
138. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 273.
139. State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1279 (Court 1985).
140. Supra note 127.
141. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
142. In re RichardT., 185 Cal. App. 3d 732, 229 Cal. Rptr. 884, 897 (1986)(holding a
warrant to be indispensable to the roadblock's validity).
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intimated ways in which the fatal defect could have been cured. We
believe that through adherence to the approach suggested by this paper,
agencies which utilize sobriety roadblocks may avert judicial suppression of evidence.
Judges, prosecutors and the defense bar must not blind themselves
to the reality of highway carnage and to the anguish of its innocent
victims. More than 25,000 are killed, hundreds of thousands injured,
and billions of dollars of property are destroyed each year, with no
relief in sight. 143 We do not advocate that the drunk driver be allowed
to add the fourth amendment to his list of casualties. However, we believe that careful planning, executed with a dedicated awareness of
state and federal constitutional requirements, will allow the employment of sobriety roadblocks, and add one more dependable weapon to
the societal battle against the drunk driver.

143. See supra, notes 97-99, 101-02 and accompanying text.

